The Evolution of Security
on the Web: An Introduction to Cryptosystems of the Internet
Contents
-Introduction
-Public and Private Keys
-One-Way Functions
-Keys and "Strong Cryptography"
-How Hackers Are Able to Break the Systems
-The Importance of Standards
-Toward a Standard for Encryption and Authentication
-Microsoft's Run at Security on the Internet
-Bibliography and Suggestions for Further Reading
Introduction
Along with the growth of
digital global connectivity commonly called the Internet, a new breed of
electronic vandals has emerged. Their favorite targets are the data
streams and deep pools of information once thought by government,
corporations, and even ourselves to be secure from interlopers. www.tartoos.com
The current perpetrators
of these digital break-ins, kidnappings, and black marketeering include
students, researchers, mathematicians, hackers, activists, and joyful
troublemakers from around the world. They are not necessarily carrying on
in the spirit of the virus writers of the 1980s. In fact, many of them
have hacked through corporate firewalls and intercepted secure and
encrypted messages with a diverse collection of goals in mind—such as a
nonlethal means to notoriety, a way of earning a bounty for discovering
holes in the ether, or even academic pursuit. Indeed, much of the
encryption-hacking done today has served to make the systems that protect
our privacy more secure.
Apparently, that's just
exactly what happened when Eric Perlman, a 15-year-old tenth grader in
Berkeley, California, recently found at least four serious bugs in
JavaScript™, including one that enabled him to track visitors to different
Web sites and to capture information from their "cookie" files. Cookie
files are where Internet browsers such as Microsoft® Internet Explorer and
Netscape Navigator store vital user information including registration
numbers and even, potentially, credit card information.www.tartoos.com
Fortunately, his ability
to manipulate Netscape's code was no fluke. He and his father, an Internet
guru for Pacific Bell, were Netscape beta testers who reviewed prereleased
versions of the software. Although his bugs have been addressed, Perlman's
exploits raise potentially serious questions about the security of
JavaScript. www.tartoos.com
Why has data become so
threatened? Reasons abound. For one thing, the quantity and breadth of
electronic data has increased dramatically from a few years ago. These
data now include financial information, corporate secrets, source code,
and passwords, in addition to the simple e-mail or the job control
language (JCL) that constitutes the main diet of data sent to mainframes
in past years. Furthermore, that vulnerability has been extended to more
fronts. In the context of the Internet, security now refers to protecting
the published information of the site itself, to storing security
information at the site, and to the secure transmission of data between
the client and the server. So, while protective measures are far more
robust than before, there is not only more economic motivation for
hackers, but also more computing resources and advanced algorithms
available for code-breaking. www.tartoos.com
The message offered by
Robert Morris, Sr., a recently retired senior scientist at the National
Security Agency (NSA) at Crypto '95 at the University of California at
Santa Barbara seems to be the following: "Never underestimate the time,
expense, and effort an opponent will expend to break a code." For accounts
of attacks on government and corporations, see the article "Your Worst
Nightmare" (Violino 1996).
We are now aware that the
attacks on our security Internet are coming, but that knowledge is not
always enough to suggest precisely which countermeasures to launch. www.tartoos.com
This article provides an
introduction to the key concepts of security: encryption, authentication,
private and public keys, digital signatures, secure commerce, code
signing, and certificate authorities. www.tartoos.com
Public
and Private Keys
The science of concealing
messages has been vital to diplomatic and military security for centuries.
Cryptographic techniques, of course, have come a long way since the simple
substitution ciphers that date back to the days of Julius Caesar.www.tartoos.com
Modern security systems
rely on encryption, which is the transformation of data into a form
unreadable by anyone without a "decryption key" (kind of like a secret
decoder ring). In a multi-user setting, encryption allows secure
communication over an insecure channel.www.tartoos.com
Until recently,
cryptography systems used the same key to encrypt and decrypt a file. With
these systems, the strength of the algorithm and the key determined the
level of security. The best algorithms are those that retain their
strength even if the algorithm is public. These systems are called
private-key, or symmetric, cryptosystems, and their advantage is speed. A
major disadvantage of private-key cryptography, however, is key
management, since each pair of individuals who wants to communicate must
have a unique shared key. For example, if you needed to encrypt
communication with five people, you would need to generate five keys to
keep your data secure (using the same private key with all five would
allow each to access information intended for the others). Since an
intruder who learned a key would be able to read any messages encrypted by
that key, you must distribute private keys for symmetric systems securely,
which may be difficult if you communicate over a network.www.tartoos.com
To address the problems
of key management, public-key or asymmetric cryptography was developed. In
this scheme, each key actually consists of two parts: the encryption half
(the "public key") and the decryption half (the "private key," which
unlocks data encrypted with the matching public key). www.tartoos.com
This "fail-safe" system
allows a more convenient key distribution method—anyone who wants to
communicate with you can use your public key. Moreover, intruders can't
use an intercepted public key to decrypt files. The downside is that
public key cryptosystems are typically slower than private ones.
Until recently, there
weren't any easy-to-use programs that implemented public key cryptography.
The advent in the early 1990s of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), a
high-security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS®, UNIX,
VAX/VMS and other computers helped change that. Now, the ease-of-use
barrier is becoming a thing of the past.www.tartoos.com
One-Way Functions
A one-way function is a
mathematical function that is significantly easier to perform in one
direction (the forward direction) than in the inverse direction. One
might, for example, compute the function in minutes but only be able to
compute the inverse in months or years. A trapdoor one-way function is a
one-way function where the inverse direction is easy if you know a certain
piece of information (the trapdoor), but is difficult otherwise. www.tartoos.com
Public-key cryptosystems
are based on (presumed) trapdoor one-way functions. The public key gives
information about the particular instance of the function; the private key
gives information about the trapdoor. Whoever knows the trapdoor can
perform the function easily in both directions, but anyone not knowing the
trapdoor can perform the function only in the forward direction. The
forward direction is used for encryption and signature verification; the
inverse direction is used for decryption and signature generation.www.tartoos.com
In almost all public-key
systems, the larger the key, the greater the difference between the
efforts necessary to compute the function in the forward and inverse
directions (for someone lacking the trapdoor). For a digital signature to
be secure for years, for example, it is necessary to use a trapdoor
one-way function with inputs great enough that someone without the
trapdoor would need many years to compute the inverse function. www.tartoos.com
All practical public-key
cryptosystems are based on functions thought to be one-way, but which have
not been proven to be so. This means that it is theoretically possible
that an algorithm could be discovered that can compute the inverse
function easily without a trapdoor; this development would render any
cryptosystem based on that one-way function insecure and useless. The fact
that most cryptosystems employ keys that expire after a year partly serves
to provide a safety net for this theoretical flaw.www.tartoos.com
Keys
and "Strong Cryptography"
The "key" is what locks
and unlocks the encryption on secured messages or data. It is a very large
number—typically the factor of an even larger prime number. Just how large
is extremely important. The larger the number, the more difficult it is
(geometrically) to figure it out and crack the encryption. www.tartoos.com
Government agencies
consider "strong" encryption systems (such as RSA, a public key
cryptosystem named for its inventors: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len
Adelman) those which use asymmetric algorithms with key sizes of more than
512 bits or symmetric algorithms (such as DES, IDEA, and RC5) with key
sizes of more than 40 bits (often referred to as "40/512 crypto").
Remember that because the public key is known in an asymmetric system,
more bits would be required to keep it secure than in a private, or
symmetric, system.www.tartoos.com
Since government
encryption policy is heavily influenced by the agencies responsible for
gathering domestic and international intelligence—the FBI and the NSA,
respectively—the government is compelled to balance the conflicting
requirements of making strong cryptography available for commercial
purposes while still making it possible for those agencies to break those
codes, if need be.www.tartoos.com
Most cryptographers,
however, don't consider 40/512 cryptography "strong" at all. In fact,
RSA's mathematicians have for several years considered 40/512 cryptography
to be "commercially inadequate," and currently recommend that domestic
customers use at least 80/768 cryptography. www.tartoos.com
Government agencies often
prefer to use the terms "strategic" and "standard" to differentiate
encryption systems. "Standard" refers to algorithms that have been drafted
and selected as a federal standard—DES (Data Encryption Standard) is the
primary example. The government defines "strategic" as any algorithm that
requires "excessive work factors" to attack successfully. Unfortunately,
the government rarely publishes criteria for what it defines as
"acceptable" or "excessive" work factors.www.tartoos.com
If, however, the key size
is, say, more than 40 digits, then its exportability (and whether or not
it can be used legally in certain applications) becomes an issue. The U.S.
government usually classifies strong cryptography on the U.S. Munitions
List as an export-controlled commodity, just like tanks and missiles. The
reasoning is that during wartime, strong cryptography in an enemy's hands
can be used to decipher crucial communications or can be used for criminal
purposes.www.tartoos.com
How
Hackers Are Able to Break the Systems
Former NSA scientist
Morris has outlined two general ways to crack a cryptosystem. One is to
exploit an unintended weakness or mistake. As Morris put it, "Look for
plaintext." In the jargon of the field, plaintext is a message in words
that anyone can read—before the message gets scrambled. No matter how
baffling the task of code breaking might seem, very fallible human beings
are the ones who must employ the sophisticated means of encryption, and
sometimes they fail. Sometimes, when one least expects it, a passage—or
even an entire message—might somehow lie unencoded within seemingly
impenetrable code. In that case, you can read it as easily as a newspaper.
The other method is to
unleash a frontal assault on the crypto by directing more resources—both
computational and intellectual—toward breaking the code than the system
designers would have ever thought possible.www.tartoos.com
Perhaps a good way to
distinguish between the two methods is to imagine you have your friend
Jerry's ATM card. It's your challenge to crack his PIN. You might begin by
trying his address or the last 4 digits of his phone number. You might try
each of them backwards and if that fails, perhaps his birthday or even the
numbers he always plays at the track. If you guess correctly, your success
is a measure of Jerry's lack of subtlety. www.tartoos.com
Employing a frontal
assault, on the other hand, you start with 0000. If that doesn't work you
try 0001, and so on. This is obviously a much more tedious and
time-consuming method, but with only 10,000 combinations to process, it is
bound to work eventually.www.tartoos.com
The
Significance of Factoring in Cryptography
But what about much
larger numbers? "Factoring" is the underlying, presumably
difficult-to-solve problem upon which several public-key cryptosystems,
including RSA, are based. Factoring is the act of splitting an integer
into a set of factors. For example, the factors of 15 are 3 and 5; the
factoring problem is to find 3 and 5 when given 15. That's easy. But what
about 63,354,827,631? Or how about a 254-digit number? Prime factorization
requires splitting an integer into factors that are prime numbers; every
integer has a unique prime factorization. Multiplying two prime integers
together is easy, but as far as we know, factoring the product is much
more difficult.www.tartoos.com
Factoring an RSA key or
"modulus" would allow an attacker to figure out the private key; thus,
anyone who can factor the modulus can decrypt messages and forge
signatures. The security of RSA, therefore, depends on making factoring
difficult, although significant advances in the mathematics of factoring
have emerged in recent decades that make the task somewhat easier.
Therefore, factoring researchers still consider the possibility that a
quick-and-easy factoring method might be discovered quite remote.www.tartoos.com
Suffice it to say,
factoring large numbers takes more time than factoring smaller numbers.
This is why the size of the modulus in RSA determines how secure an actual
use of RSA is: The larger the modulus, the longer it takes to factor, and
thus the more resistant to attack the RSA implementation is. For a
complete discussion of the science of factoring and the higher mathematics
brought to bear, visit the RSA Secure Data site. www.tartoos.com
Cracking the Code
The RSA system was the
first manifestation of the breakthrough in theoretical public key
cryptography. To prove the system's soundness, Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
were asked in the late 1970s to devise a challenge.
Rivest picked an RSA key
of 129 digits, encoded a message with it and offered U.S.$100 to anyone
who could decode the message. The three inventors felt their C-note was as
secure as their code. After all, Rivest estimated that it would take a
supercomputer 40 quadrillion years (that's a 40 with 15 zeros) to break
the code. Even if one did not accept that time frame (which Rivest later
said was a miscalculation), a much shorter time—say a billion years, or
even a few million—would ensure that anyone breathing today would be long
gone before the secret of the RSA-129 message would be revealed.
Fifteen years later, the
public-key encryption scheme had spread into many security systems, and
the RSA-129 key was still unbroken. That's when, in 1992, a 21-year-old
M.I.T. electrical engineering graduate student named Derek Atkins first
saw the PGP program, which was based on the RSA key. Atkins immediately
recognized its importance and joined the worldwide, unpaid development
team that works on new versions of the software. But as Atkins talked to
friends about the program, he began to wonder what attacks might work
against it.
It is worth noting that
since 1977 when Rivest posited his RSA-129 challenge, advancements in the
mathematics of factoring had advanced at a steady pace. Thus, with the
help of these advancements and the software written by Atkins and his team
to gather what they called the "needles"—the possible factors of very
large prime numbers—they set out to crack RSA-129. From September 1992 to
April 1993, they employed more than 1,600 computers, from desktop PCs to
Bellcore's 16,000-processor MasPar supercomputer, the equivalent of about
5,000 MIPS years. When Atkins and the others guessed that they had enough
unit vectors, or "needles," for the calculation, they gathered them to
find the private key. On April 26, 1993—roughly eight months after they
started—Atkins posted the key for RSA-129 on the Net:
We are happy to announce
that RSA-129 =
11438162575788886766923577997614661201021829672124236256256184293
5706935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 =
3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 *
327691329932667709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533
Applying the key yielded
the message: "The magic words are squeamish ossifrage." An ossifrage is a
large predatory bird of the vulture family, ranging from the mountainous
regions of southern Europe to China and having a wide wingspan and black
plumage. Not surprisingly, Rivest had forgotten what the message
contained.
Atkins and his team
donated the money to the Free Software Foundation. It is only fair to
report that Rivest, aware of recent advancements in factoring algorithms,
had resolved to himself that one day he might have to write the check for
$100. "[My original estimate of 40 quadrillion years] was probably
accurate for the analysis of the fastest algorithm we knew about at the
time, but technology was moving fast on the factoring frontier," Rivest
said. www.tartoos.com
It is also important to
note that breaking the RSA-129 does not mean that PGP in particular, or
RSA encryption in general, is weak. An RSA key based on a 129-digit prime
is only 425 bits long. Atkins later calculated that had his team attempted
the same task, using the same factoring algorithm with the recommended RSA
key of 1,024 bits, their computers would still be working on the
problem—for a few more million years.www.tartoos.com
The
Importance of Standards
We have touched upon a
number of concepts and terminology associated with sophisticated
cryptography in the sections above. Now, let's move on to some of the
other key issues and how they relate to the strategy Microsoft is planning
for the future.
Microsoft has made a
strong commitment to supporting existing Internet standards. Microsoft is
actively participating in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and other organizations. Recent examples
include the Personal Information Exchange (PFX) protocol submitted to the
W3C Digital Signature Initiative; the code signing proposal submitted to
the W3C; and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard aimed at creating
a single secure channel standard.
Standards are the force
behind the success and power of the Internet. These include:
-
Common language and
naming. All computers on the Internet speak the same language—Transfer
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and resources are easily
accessed through a common naming scheme using Domain Name Servers (DNS)
and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs).
-
Common format and
protocols. A significant amount of the content is stored in a common
format: HyperText Markup Language (HTML). Files are transferred using
standard protocols (such as HTTP, FTP, and SMTP).
-
Consistent and powerful
user model. All browsers on the World Wide Web (WWW) use URLs,
hyperlinks, and in-frame navigation, providing an efficient user
paradigm for traversing an endless "docu-verse."
-
Server-side processing
extensions. Through standard methods such as CGI (Common Gateway
Interface), WWW servers can be extended to communicate with back-end
scripts, dynamically produce the content of a Web page, store user
information, or purchase goods.
To that end, Microsoft
will support all HTML extensions, file formats, languages, and protocols
that its customers require to create compelling software solutions.
Microsoft will continue to research and monitor Internet technology, such
as Java™ and HTML, including noncompliant but popular HTML extensions. As
Microsoft moves forward in addressing the challenges of the Internet, it
will continue to work with the standards bodies to ensure that it is
openly publishing its proposed extensions, protocols, and file formats.
Secure,
Yet Usable
To be effective, security
systems need to be usable as well as secure. It stands to reason that
prohibitively hard-to-use schemes, which require new passwords and
separately designed server components will simply not be used as often as
a scheme built into the design of the components already in use.
What this means to end
users is that, no matter which platform or browser is used, the security
component should be transparent. Let's consider again the case of Alice.
Alice has spent hours at the office getting digital IDs, keys, and
encrypted messages on her office IBM-compatible PC with the "Brand X"
browser. She needs to continue her work at home on her Macintosh with the
"Brand Y" browser. She should also be able to take her digital IDs to a
friend's house, to a mall, or to a kiosk. If she does not have this
capability, she will be locked into using one machine, one platform, and
one brand of browser. The challenge is to continue to define and adopt
standards to allow Alice to go anywhere and do anything irrespective of
which tools she employs.
Standards are critical to
establishing a common security framework for communicating among
applications or providing access to information to users on various
platforms. One of the first successes has been the unification of a
standard for credit card-like transactions over the Internet.
Visa, MasterCard,
Netscape, Microsoft, and others have worked to combine the two formerly
dominant specifications for the secure transaction of commerce over the
Internet: Secure Transaction Technology (STT) and Secure Electronic
Payment Process (SEPP). By June 1996, this combined specification—Secure
Electronic Transactions (SET)—will be finalized. The results of this
cooperation show that standards are achievable and beneficial not only for
developers, but also for the end users if we still desire to be able to
use any platform and any browser to connect to the Internet. Clearly, both
industry and customers benefit from a single standard for commercial
transactions.
Toward
a Standard for Encryption and Authentication
Microsoft is also
pursuing an effort to create a single standard for the transfer of secure
business and personal communications over insecure phone lines. A central
component of this effort is to develop a method of authentication.
Encryption and
authentication go hand in hand in a secure Internet or intranet
environment. Each, though distinctly different, play an important role in
allowing users to pass information that is unreadable except by the
intended recipient and in verifying the identify of the sender.
Authentication in a
digital setting is a process whereby the receiver of a digital message can
be confident of the identity of the sender and/or the integrity of the
message. Authentication protocols can be based on either conventional
secret-key cryptosystems like DES or on public-key systems like RSA or
Microsoft's PCT. In public-key systems, authentication uses digital
signatures.
In this article,
authentication generally refers to the use of digital signatures, which
are the equivalent of handwritten signatures for printed documents: The
signature is an unforgeable piece of data asserting that a named person
wrote or otherwise agreed to the document on which the signature appears.
The recipient, as well as a third party, can verify both that the document
did indeed originate from the person who signed it and that the document
has not been altered since it was signed. A secure digital signature
system thus consists of two parts: a method of signing a document so that
forgery is unfeasible and a method of signature verification. Furthermore,
secure digital signatures cannot be repudiated; that is, the signer of a
document cannot later disown it by claiming it was forged, since each
digital signature is registered with a Certificate Authority (CA).
There are currently two
widely used standards for such secure communications: Netscape's Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Microsoft's Private Communication Technology
(PCT). As was the case with SET, both developers and end users would
benefit greatly from a single standard. www.tartoos.com
To help facilitate
movement in that direction, Microsoft has created a discussion draft
called Secure Transport Layer Protocol (STLP), which is rapidly becoming
Transport Layer Security (TLS). This specification starts with Netscape's
SSL version 3.0 and adds features from Microsoft's PCT version 2.0 based
on feedback from cryptographers and implementers. It is intended to
provide a simpler and more robust implementation than SSL or PCT, with
added scalability, improved security, and the additional functionality
needed for wider application of the specification. For an expanded
discussion of standards and Microsoft's goals for security technology,
plus an invitation to software developers to submit their security
technologies, see Microsoft Submits Draft on Security Interoperability to
W3C (http://microsoft.com/intdev/security/secw3c-f.htm). www.tartoos.com
Microsoft's Run at Security on the Internet
Of course, a lot of work
has to be done besides participating with standards bodies and posting
press releases. One of Microsoft's contributions has been to integrate
these standards into all of its Internet development. In terms of
implementation, with an Internet Information Server solution running on
Windows NT, privacy becomes a matter of mouse clicks away for a site
administrator.
Secure Communications
Features
www.tartoos.com
Microsoft's support for
SSL 2.0 and 3.0, and Private Communication Technology (PCT) 1.0, for
example, secures general-purpose business and personal communications on
the Internet or intranets by providing the following:
www.tartoos.com
-
Private communications.
SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, and PCT 1.0 create a secure channel and encrypts
communications, ensuring that potential intruders are unable to
intercept a digital conversation.
-
Client/Server authentication.
SSL 3.0 authenticates the client or server and enables either the client
or the server to require authentication of the other. Support for client
authentication through SSL 3.0 enables you to present digital
identification to Web sites that request it. This lets you verify your
identity across the Internet so that you can gain access to subscription
services. If you obtain more than one Certificate Authority, Microsoft
Internet Explorer 3.0 lets you control which certificate you present to
different Web sites. SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, and PCT 1.0 server authentication
ensures that you are communicating with your intended party. In
addition, authentication ensures the recipient of a message that only
the sender could have sent the message and that the message has not been
altered in transit.
www.tartoos.com
Microsoft Internet Security Framework
Microsoft has announced a
collection of technologies to address the concerns of Fortune 500
corporate information service (IS) groups, independent software vendors
(ISVs), and Webmasters interested in the convergence of the corporate
intranet and the public Internet. The Microsoft Internet Security
Framework—a comprehensive set of public-key and password-based security
technologies—provides the ability to:
www.tartoos.com
-
Exchange information
securely across public networks.
-
Control access from the
public networks to the corporate network.
-
Engage in electronic
commerce.
The Microsoft Internet
Security Framework accomplishes this without requiring replacement of an
existing security model. Instead, it builds on the Windows operating
system security model and also provides an extensible architecture that
integrates these security technologies into this model.
As mentioned earlier, it
is extremely important that users feel comfortable storing personal
security information, such as credit card numbers and private keys, on
their computers and that this information be available—subject to a user's
approval—to different programs such as browsers and e-mail applications.
To satisfy these requirements, one technology emerging from the Microsoft
Internet Security Framework is the "digital wallet."
The wallet resides on a
user's computer (or another hardware device such as a smartcard). It
securely stores personal security information such as private keys, credit
card numbers, and certificates. Like all Microsoft Security Framework
services, it has standard programming interfaces that make it accessible
to other programs in a protected and controlled fashion. The contents of
the wallet can be transported across machines, platforms, and browsers
using the PFX protocol. An access control policy determines who has access
to the information.
Internet Explorer 3.0
contains a simple certificate store or database to support client
authentication. The wallet is slated initially to ship in a release of
Internet Explorer (all platforms) and will eventually be integrated into
the Windows operating system.
For more information, check out the
Microsoft Internet Security Framework. www.tartoos.com
Code
Signing
Not since the first
software was made available on CD-ROM have software publishers and
independent developers alike been so excited about a new way to distribute
their work. Via the Internet, manuals, upgrades, patches, even full
release software can be made almost instantly accessible to users at a
fraction of the manufacturing and distribution costs. With the security
problems of online commerce largely addressed, online delivery of software
has the potential to eliminate not only some components of costly order
processing but also to lower the cost of goods. No longer must publishers
provide disks, perfect-bound manuals, expensive packaging, or
environmentally destructive packing foam, not to mention suffering the
costs and delays implied in shipping.
But wait! This "wonder
channel" for software delivery is not without its potential problems.
Besides the considerable download time required to transfer large
applications, the security risks associated with downloading software over
the Internet include "Trojan Horse" attacks, viruses, counterfeit
publishing and "gray market" losses, and even the malicious modification
of code. That's where code signing comes in.
Code signing solves these
problems by eliminating two of the major risks to users who download code:
(1) it ensures the user that they are receiving the code from the software
maker, and (2) it alerts the user if the code has been modified since it
was signed by the software publisher.
Code signing uses some of the same concepts already
discussed in this document and is explained in "Microsoft Authenticode
Technology" on Microsoft's Security Advisor Web site at
http://www.microsoft.com/security/.. If you need
more information or have specific questions, please send e-mail to
safecode@microsoft.com.
The advantage of code
signing is that it enables the recipient to identify who published the
software before downloading it as well as verify that no one tampered with
it. Authors of ActiveX™ controls and other enhancements to Internet tools
should be able to recognize this benefit immediately. www.tartoos.com
Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0
supports code signing.
For a description of the security features employed
in Microsoft's Internet Explorer, including digital code signing and
CryptoAPI 1.0, see
"Using Authenticode" and the
Microsoft Internet Security Framework
The
Microsoft Digital Signature Initiativewww.tartoos.com
Microsoft and VeriSign,
Inc., the leading provider of digital authentication products and
services, have announced they will jointly promote secure authentication
and distribution of software over the Internet. The companies have worked
together to define a set of technologies for content signing using Digital
Signatures and Digital IDs. A Digital ID, a kind of digital "passport" or
"credential," is a user's public key that has itself been "digitally
signed" by a trusted party, such as a network security director, MIS help
desk, or VeriSign, Inc. Microsoft will be incorporating the technology
into the appropriate Internet development components.
For related information,
call VeriSign at (415) 961-7500 or visit the VeriSign Web site
(http://www.verisign.com/).
Certificates
A certificate is
analogous to a notary seal on a document. It must be kept current and
subject to verification on a certificate revocation list (CRL). If a
certificate is revoked—as a credit card is revoked—the document it is
attached to should be treated as suspect. Just as a bank cannot force
people to cut up their credit cards, a Certificate Authority (CA) cannot
force the destruction of all copies of a certificate. Therefore, someone
who is going to use a certificate should check it against a CRL to ensure
the validity of the certificate and the recipient must have a convenient
way to make that determination. That's where the Certificate Server comes
into play. www.tartoos.com
The Certificate Server is
designed to make certificate management tasks as simple as possible by
issuing, managing, and revoking certificates. Because the Microsoft
Internet Security Framework is an integral part of the Windows NT security
model, certificates can be mapped to a Windows NT group. This means that
you can use the standard Windows NT administrative tools, such as access
control lists, to handle Internet security matters. The Certificate Server
will also be integrated with BackOffice™. www.tartoos.com
The Certificate Server is
integrated with an Open Database Connectivity–compliant database such as
Microsoft SQL Server™ that holds such information as CRLs, auditing
information about certificates that were issued, and copies of
certificates. Some key features of the Certificate Server are:
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Key management
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Policy independence
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Transport independence
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High reliability
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Adherence to standards
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